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LABOR RELATIONS COLLABORATION FROM START 
TO FINISH: A CASE STUDY ON A FIRST CONTRACT 
FOR WESTMINSTER COLORADO FIREFIGHTERS 
By Lisa R. Callaway and Rebecca C. Barnard* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
For many labor negotiations practitioners, regardless of whether they are on 
the labor or management side, the certification of a new bargaining unit is a 
familiar event, noteworthy only in the fact that previously unrepresented 
employees now have representation. Where some states’ public sector labor 
relations acts go back decades, the public sector labor boards overseeing the 
statutes are regularly certifying new bargaining units, some through secret 
ballot elections and others through card check.1  
In Westminster, Colorado, a new collective bargaining statute signed into 
law in 2013 provided public sector employees with substantive bargaining 
rights. Westminster firefighters organized their workforce and sought 
bargaining rights with their employer, the City of Westminster. This article 
focuses on the creative and collaborative manner in which this occurred from 
start to finish, from drafting a referendum question and City ordinance to 
bargaining of the first contract using the FMCS Affinity Bargaining model. 
The City of Westminster is a home rule municipality, a suburb of Denver 
located to its northwest. Westminster has a population of approximately 
112,000 residents and is located in Adams and Jefferson counties.2 
The Westminster Fire Department operates from six fire stations. In 
addition to traditional fire department services, the Department has EMS 
and ambulance services; performs water rescues and technical rescues; and 
responds to hazardous material incidents and other emergencies. The 
Department also responds to large scale disasters through the City’s 
emergency management program.3 Under the Fire Chief’s direction there 
are two divisions: (1) Administrative; and (2) Operations and Emergency 
Services. There is a deputy chief heading each of the divisions. On the 
administrative side, there are battalion chiefs, a training chief, and an EMS 
chief. The bargaining unit is made up of captains, lieutenants, paramedics, 
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engineers and firefighters. There are approximately 136 sworn employees in 
the Fire Department and 121 employees in the bargaining unit.4 
Besides the firefighters, represented by International Association of Fire 
Fighters (IAFF), Local 2889, no other Westminster employees are 
represented by a union. 
II. HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RIGHTS IN 
COLORADO  
Colorado’s labor history dates back to the 1940s. Following the passage of 
the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, in 1943, Colorado passed the Labor 
Peace Act.5 The law required a vote of 50% plus one for a union to become 
the exclusive representative of a group of employees. Assuming the first vote 
passed, the second vote, requiring a seventy-five-vote plurality, determined 
whether there would be an “all-union” agreement. If the all-union vote 
passed, the employees would be covered by a union security agreement (i.e., 
union shop with mandatory dues).6  
After the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) repealed the requirement for 
a separate election for security agreements in 1951, there was confusion 
regarding whether or not a separate vote for a union security agreement was 
still required in Colorado. Many unions, believing it was no longer necessary 
to hold a second vote, chose not to. However, in 1976 the Supreme Court of 
Colorado held in Communication Workers of America v. Western Electric 
Co. that a separate vote was required for passing a union security agreement, 
resulting in the invalidation of thousands of union security agreements.7 
Then in 1977, the Colorado legislature passed a law permitting unions that 
had not ratified their union security agreements separately to ratify the 
agreements through a written agreement between the employer and union, 
thus saving many union agreements.8 Separate ratification would be 
required for all agreements after June 29, 1977.9 The procedure continues to 
exist today. 
In 2007, following Democratic Governor Bill Ritter’s election, and with a 
Democratically-controlled state house and senate, unions attempted to 
repeal the requirement for a separate election for union security agreements 
through HB 1072. In February 2007, Governor Ritter vetoed the bill, citing 
political divisiveness and the lack of open dialogue between the 
stakeholders.10 But later in that same year, Governor Ritter signed an 
executive order recognizing labor unions and permitting them to negotiate 
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with the state government.11 For the first time, Colorado public sector unions 
had some bargaining rights, albeit that the right was limited as any 
agreement reached was non-binding.  
Following the signing of the executive order, a right-to-work measure was 
placed on the 2008 ballot, asking: 
Shall there be an amendment to the Colorado constitution 
concerning participation in a labor organization as a condition of 
employment, and, in connection therewith, prohibiting an 
employer from requiring that a person be a member and pay any 
moneys to a labor organization or to any other third party in lieu 
of payment to a labor organization and creating a misdemeanor 
criminal penalty for any person who violates the provision of the 
section?12 
The measure was defeated with 56.1% of voters voting no.13 In 2009, 
Governor Ritter vetoed a bill that would have given firefighters a right to 
collectively bargain.14 Despite repeated attempts, Colorado remains a non-
right-to-work state today, along with twenty-two other states.15 
In 2013, “The Colorado Firefighter Safety Act” (also known as Senate Bill 13-
025 or SB 25), gave Colorado firefighters a path to a potential collective 
bargaining right.16 Senator Lois Tochtrop introduced the bill on January 9, 
2013.17 In February of that year, Democratic Governor John Hickenlooper 
threatened to veto the bill because it did not give municipalities a say in 
unionization. He stated: “[W]e do not believe it is a matter of state interest 
to require mandatory bargaining between a locality and its firefighters.”18 SB 
25 was passed by the Senate with a 20-14 approval on April 26, 2013, and 
signed into law by the governor on June 5, 2013 in a form that, according to 
him, provided municipalities with the voice in collective bargaining he was 
looking for.19 
While cloaked under firefighter safety, with the recitals in the final law 
further emphasizing firefighter safety, SB 25 is a true collective bargaining 
law. It includes an obligation to “meet and confer” for all municipal 
employers and their firefighters20 and codifies a municipality’s and union’s 
mutual obligation to engage in collective bargaining, with the traditional 
good faith bargaining obligation, to discuss “compensation, hours, and terms 
and conditions of employment” and to execute a written contract 
memorializing their agreements for a period of between one and three 
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years.21 The collective bargaining obligation applies to public employers that 
employ twenty-four or more firefighters.22 
The term “compensation” is expressly defined by SB 25. “Compensation” is 
“base wages or salary; any form of direct monetary payments; employer-paid 
health, accident, life, and disability insurance programs; employer-paid 
pension programs, including the amount of pension and contributions to the 
extent not controlled by law; deferred compensation; retiree health 
programs; paid time off; uniform and equipment allowances; expense 
reimbursement; and all eligibility conditions for compensation.”23 Unlike 
many statutes, and often where the interpretation is left to labor boards and 
courts, the SB 25 definition appears contained and finite. Similarly, "terms 
and conditions of employment" is defined as “compensation, hours, and all 
matters affecting the employment of firefighters, including items related to 
safety, except the budget and organizational structure of the public 
employer.”24 SB 25 also includes an obligation by the public employer to 
deduct union dues and assessments from its employees upon written request 
to the employer.25 
In order to gain collective bargaining rights, the Colorado Firefighter Safety 
Act requires a group of firefighters to turn to the voters for approval, via the 
voter referendum process.26 The Act defines firefighter as “an employee of a 
public employer whose primary duties are directly involved with the 
provision of fire protection or firefighting services.” It continues: 
“‘Firefighter’ does not include clerical personnel or volunteer firefighters.”27 
In order to get a referendum on the ballot, a firefighter employee 
organization must provide the employer with a notice of intent to circulate a 
petition amongst voters. The notice of intent must be signed by at least 
seventy-five percent of the proposed bargaining unit. Following submission 
of a notice of intent, representatives from the proposed bargaining unit must 
obtain signatures from five percent of voters unless a city charter or local 
ordinance declares otherwise.28 Assuming the requisite number of 
signatures is obtained, the referendum question is: “Should the firefighters 
employed by the [name of the public employer] be covered by the ‘Colorado 
Firefighter Safety Act’?”29 A simple majority vote is required for the 
referendum to pass. In the event the referendum fails, the issue may not be 
placed on the ballot again for four years.30  
Colorado Springs is currently following the procedure set forth by the Act. 
The International Association of Firefighters (IAFF), Local 5 collected 
16,000 voter signatures to earn a place on the April 2019 ballot.31 Firefighter 
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unions in Denver, Fort Collins, Aurora, and Pueblo, Colorado all have 
collective bargaining status.32 Other Colorado communities with collective 
bargaining agreements with their firefighters include Arvada, Boulder, 
Thornton, and Commerce City, and there are fire protection district 
collective bargaining agreements as well. 
III. THE WESTMINSTER FIREFIGHTER BARGAINING RIGHTS 
PROCESS 
A. The Ballot Initiative 
In 2014, the Westminster IAFF, Local 2889 (Local 2889), petitioned the 
Westminster City Council to authorize collective bargaining for the 
Westminster firefighters. Local 2889 members had begun the process of 
getting signatures to satisfy the requirements of the Firefighter Safety Act 
and gain recognition as the exclusive representative for the Westminster 
firefighters. The City Council’s consideration of Local 2889’s request 
continued into early 2015 when new City Manager Don Tripp came to 
Westminster. City Manager Tripp began meeting with Local 2889 
representatives to understand the Local’s concerns, and Fire Chief Doug Hall 
was brought into the discussions. Over several weeks, twenty-one separate 
meetings were held with more than 150 Westminster Fire Department staff 
in attendance (some attended more than one meeting). Through these 
meetings, City Administration and Local 2889 Executive Board 
representatives worked together to find resolutions to the Local’s concerns 
and began to develop a collaborative relationship and problem-solving 
model.  
On February 18, 2016, Local 2889 delivered to the City a Notice of Intent to 
circulate a petition pursuant to the Colorado Firefighter Safety Act. City 
Manager Tripp reached out to Local 2889 with an innovative idea. Since SB 
25 permitted the City to adopt a local ordinance with an alternative 
procedure to the tedious process of obtaining voter signatures, the City 
Manager proposed that the City would waive the signature requirement if the 
parties would work together on an agreeable ballot question. The City 
proposed that it then would put the ballot question regarding representation 
to the Westminster voters.  
The City and Local 2889 worked collaboratively to draft an acceptable ballot 
question—one that would be supported by the City Council, Local 2889 
leadership, and the Local’s membership. There were multiple drafts, some 
not acceptable to Local 2889. At one point in the process, Local 2889 
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leadership continued to collect voter signatures, resorting to the SB 25 
process. In May, Local 2889 President Ron Taylor contacted City Manager 
Tripp to make one more attempt to try to find mutually acceptable ballot 
language. The parties were successful and on May 16, 2016, the City Council 
approved the resolution for the agreeable referendum question. 
The City called a special election (Westminster regular elections are only held 
in odd years) to set the firefighter collective bargaining ballot question for 
the November 8, 2016, general election. The ballot referendum question, 
titled “Firefighters’ Safety and Collective Bargaining Question,” was: 
Shall the City Council of the City of Westminster enact an ordinance by 
July 1, 2017, which would prohibit Westminster firefighters from 
striking and create a mutual obligation between the designated 
representative of Westminster firefighters and the City to bargain 
collectively in good faith with respect to such terms that include, but 
might not be limited to, wages, benefits, and items related to personal 
safety, with such agreements made upon these terms memorialized in 
a contract enacted by the City Council, with disputes resolved by non-
binding arbitration with impasses to be submitted to the electors of the 
City for final resolution? 
The ballot question passed with 57 percent voter approval. 
B. Drafting the Ordinance 
With the referendum approved and the vote certified, the clock began ticking 
for the drafting of the ordinance. The drafting and approval process had to 
be completed by July 1, 2017, a relatively short timeline. It was now up to 
City officials to flush out the details of what was, in effect, a collective 
bargaining statute. Because there existed no statute to outline collective 
bargaining duties and obligations, it was up to the City Council to adopt an 
ordinance providing the type of detail that usually exists in a public sector 
labor statute. 
Items that needed to be addressed in the ordinance included: 
a. A general statement of policy to define the purpose and 
parameters of the ordinance; 
b. A list of relevant definitions for terms used throughout the 
ordinance, including a definition for the terms used in the 
referendum question; 
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c. A list of preserved management rights; 
d. A prohibition against strikes, work stoppages and similar 
behaviors, to capture the same in the referendum question; 
e. A list of inherent employee rights existing in addition to the 
collective union rights; 
f. A process for certification, decertification, and recognition of 
an exclusive representative; 
g. A statement of the obligation to collectively bargain, the 
obligation to incorporate agreements into a collective 
bargaining agreement and the relevant timelines for the 
process; 
h. An impasse resolution procedure, including the use of an 
advisory fact-finder and non-binding arbitration and the right 
of either party to submit any issues not agreed upon to the 
voters.33  
The Westminster ordinance drafting process began in January 2017. Like the 
ballot question initiative, drafting the ordinance involved collaborative 
efforts. Drafting the ordinance took approximately four months and included 
input from staff, Council members, Local Executive Board members and City 
and Local 2889 legal counsel. To start the process, the City Council and Local 
2889 agreed to core principles that would guide their discussions and the 
drafting of the ordinance. Those principles included the following: 
1. Protect the (City) Charter and home rule authority 
2. Maintain competitive market-based wage and benefit 
package 
3. Provide for fire union input  
4. Protect management rights 
5. Protect the safety of employees and citizens 
6. Maintain equity to all employees as individuals 
7. Bargain based on interests vs. positional, using an interest-
based bargaining model 
8. Ensure that the agreed-upon collective bargaining 
agreement is financially sustainable and fiscally 
responsible 
9. Protect employee rights 
10. Create employee engagement and opportunities for 
positive change 
11. Build respectful relationships between labor, management 
and all stakeholders. 
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Notably, the principles (7) bargain based on interests vs. positional and (11) 
build respectful relationships between labor, management and all 
stakeholders carried forward the collaborative approach that began with the 
drafting of the referendum question. While City and Union rights and input 
were key, principles 6, 9 and 10 addressed maintaining the rights of the 
individual employee, an important goal for the Council and City staff. 
With a draft of the ordinance taking many iterations, the City worked to 
incorporate as much of the Local’s input as was possible, while not conceding 
important management rights or other rights mandated under the City 
Charter. The Local wanted, for instance, a broader definition of the subjects 
for collective bargaining. It also wanted the rank of captain to be included in 
the bargaining unit, which the City subsequently agreed to during the 
ordinance discussions. The City also agreed to an ordinance giving some 
broader bargaining rights. However, the City was not agreeable to including 
minimum staffing or scheduling as subjects for bargaining.34  
The ordinance was adopted by the City Council in May 2017, with members 
of the Local 2889 Executive Board present as a showing of support. The core 
principles were carried forward and are contained in the Statement of Policy 
at the very beginning of the final ordinance.35  
The American Arbitration Association (AAA) certified Local 2889 as the 
“certified employee organization” on December 8, 2017, after a secret ballot 
election was conducted. The vote was 109-0. On January 10, 2018, the City 
received a demand to bargain. 
IV. THE INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING MODEL 
The City and Local 2889 were committed to negotiating their first contract 
using an interest-based bargaining (IBB) process. They believed that if the 
relationship started based on IBB principals, it would be a solid foundation 
for their relationship moving forward. The parties sought out the assistance 
of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) to facilitate the 
process. 
A. The FMCS Interest-Based Bargaining Model 
FMCS describes interest-based bargaining as “a collaborative approach to 
resolving labor and management disputes. Through the process, parties 
proactively identify durable solutions to outcomes at the bargaining table. 
Agreements are based on mutual and individual interests rather than 
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positions. This approach emphasizes problem solving and enables mutual 
gain outcomes.”36 Javier Ramirez, FMCS Director, Agency Initiatives, 
explains that the parties are not spending their time strategizing when to 
make a move, but rather are focused on solving the problem.37 Essentially 
the parties are transforming negotiations from a win-lose strategy into a 
puzzle to be solved by the group as a whole. 
 
In Roger Fisher and William Ury’s classic book Getting to Yes, the authors 
explain that a negotiation method “should produce a wise agreement…, 
should be efficient…, [and] should improve or at least not damage the 
relationship between the parties.”38 Fisher and Ury developed a theory of 
negotiation called “principled negotiation,” later named interest-based 
bargaining (“IBB”) by FMCS.39 The IBB method “produces wise agreements 
amicably and efficiently.”40 
 
Fisher and Ury describe four key ideas that form principled negotiation: “1) 
people: separate the people from the problem; 2) focus on interests, not 
positions; 3) options: generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what 
to do; and 4) insist that the result be based on an objective standard.”41 
 
The FMCS interest-based bargaining model directly embodies these four 
elements.42 The FMCS model is a group problem-solving process that focuses 
on the common interests of the parties to create effective solutions which can 
be supported by the entire group. It is intended to strengthen the labor-
management relationship. All conversations and interactions occur at the 
joint table between the designated team members. Any caucuses, which are 
discouraged, are an exception and must be limited. A simplified explanation 
of the process is as follows: 
 
1. Framing the Issues 
Each party must frame its individual issues to identify the topics of 
negotiation, as opposed to presenting proposals in traditional 
negotiations. The issue-framing procedure is known as the “what,” or 
“what is the problem we’re trying to solve?” There is a process to 
framing issues, however, so they don’t look like positional, adversarial, 
and win-lose propositions. The steps in the issue-framing process 
include: 1) express the topic as a question; 2) frame the question as a 
joint problem; 3) ask the question objectively; 4) do not suggest the 
answer by the manner in which the question is phrased; and 5) leave 
the problem open to multiple solutions. For example, a concern might 
Spring 2019  ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT  13 
be stated in traditional negotiations as “Employees are claiming that 
overtime is being improperly assigned based on favoritism and are 
demanding that this practice be stopped immediately and that 
supervisors be instructed on proper procedures.” Using the FMCS 
issue framing process, the same issue might be restated as: “What can 
we do to improve procedures in the assignment of overtime?”43 
2. Identifying Interests 
As part of the parties’ transition from sharing the issues to identifying 
their interests, an individual or group shares the story of the issue. For 
instance, “this is why we want to talk about this situation.” It is best to 
be specific and provide examples so others can truly gain an 
understanding of the reason(s) for raising the issue. 
3.  Generate Options 
The process of getting to options, or the “how” of the process, is the 
next step. Like the previous steps, there is great value to the group’s 
hearing options and building additional solutions from what is stated. 
There are invariably multiple options to resolve an issue so this step is 
best accomplished by permitting the free-flow of potential options with 
the philosophy that “no idea is a bad idea.” Sometimes options are only 
partial options to solve the issue, which is acceptable. A partial option 
might raise another partial option to work in tandem. An option is not 
a proposal and does not have to solve the entire issue to be included. 
In any event, the options will be discussed and evaluated by the entire 
group to determine each one’s viability. 
4. Review Standards for Evaluation 
Under the FMCS model, there is a standardized process for reviewing 
and determining the efficacy of all options. This standards evaluation 
process is referred to as the F, B, and A process.  
First, a specific option must be feasible. It must be capable 
of being done. Factors to use in determining feasibility 
include the legality of the option; whether it’s affordable; 
whether it’s workable and practical; and whether it’s 
understandable.44 
The second standard is whether the option is beneficial. 
This standard requires the parties to evaluate each option 
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based on whether it improves the condition that caused the 
issue to be raised. If it doesn’t satisfy a party’s interest, or 
causes harm, then this standard has not been met.45 
The third standard is whether the option is acceptable. The 
option has to be favorably received by both parties to pass 
this standard. It’s critical that when evaluating the 
acceptability standard, the evaluation is simply whether 
the option is acceptable and not whether this is the most 
acceptable option. Because a participant likes another 
option better is not a reason to fail to support an acceptable 
option at this stage of the process.46 
5. Evaluate the Options 
One by one, the parties will review each option for each issue statement 
individually to determine the F, B, and A status. If an option doesn’t 
make it past any of the standards, it is immediately discarded. For 
example, an option must be feasible to get to the beneficial standard 
analysis. If it is not feasible, it is discarded without any further analysis.  
Additionally, all options are evaluated by consensus. If an individual 
does not like an option and others do, that individual has to explain 
why the option is not acceptable to the individual. It also bears 
repeating that the analysis is not whether a particular option is the best 
option, but whether it is an acceptable option having applied all three 
factors. 
B. Keys to Success in the Process 
This interest-based bargaining process supports the two parties’ working 
together and discourages any behaviors that get in the way. When a 
participant puts an option up for consideration, the option is the group’s 
idea, not a union participant’s idea or an employer participant’s idea.47 This 
part of the process allows the group to focus on interests and options, not on 
what side came up with the idea, thus allowing everyone to view the idea 
objectively. There is also an important “circle-back” step, a last step in the 
process, where the participants review their work to ensure their agreements 
are in alignment with their predetermined objective criteria. 
Another important step is agreement on and collection of data. All 
participants must agree on what information they need to resolve all contract 
Spring 2019  ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT  15 
issues. This should occur prior to the start of the issues/interests/options 
process so the parties are not distracted, and so that time is not wasted 
chasing down information when the parties are in the middle of the process, 
thus slowing momentum. This is particularly important with respect to 
financial data (also see Affinity model below.) There is typically extensive 
discussion surrounding the financial data needed and then secondly, how to 
read and interpret that data. For instance, in traditional negotiations, there 
is often a dispute regarding how to calculate wage increases—do you include 
roll up costs or are they excluded? Is longevity included in wage increase 
percentage calculations or is it calculated separately? As a result, when 
determining what a .25% wage increase costs, the parties often reach 
different conclusions. With interest-based bargaining, these calculations are 
discussed and agreed to as a group. So when the parties get to economic 
discussions, all participants are in agreement as to the value of a .25% 
increase and how it is calculated.  
Another key to success in this process is using a third-party facilitator. The 
importance of a facilitator who is not connected to a party and who has 
nothing to be gained by process outcomes is imperative. Such an 
independent facilitator can offer unbiased opinions and nudge the parties 
from time to time without motivation or the impropriety of such. 
Additionally, the independent facilitator can move into a mediation role if 
this is determined necessary.  
C. The Affinity Model 
When getting to economic issues, the FMCS interest-based bargaining model 
was found by FMCS to have limitations. It works with great success and 
positive outcomes when addressing the non-economic issues—any issues 
that do not have a direct and substantial economic impact. However, when 
applied to economic issues, FMCS found that the process often broke down. 
When union participants are looking for a wage increase, applying the 
issue/interest/options analysis was a strain. It was difficult to maintain 
objectivity and reach consensus. Participants tended to gravitate to 
traditional bargaining behaviors. 
With the goal of maintaining an interest-based approach from start to finish, 
FMCS mediators were determined to find a way for the parties not to slide 
back to traditional bargaining. The Hinsdale, Illinois office of FMCS 
developed an alternate process which the agency titled the Affinity Economic 
Bargaining (AEB or Affinity) model as an effective problem-solving way to 
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approach the economic issues in bargaining.48 FMCS soon saw success in the 
AEB model for resolving economic issues in an efficient way. The Affinity 
model is now used nationwide. 
The AEB model modified the Affinity diagraming tool, essentially reversing 
the process. Affinity diagraming is a facilitation tool that can be used to sort 
large amounts of data or ideas.49 It was originally developed by Kawakita Jiro 
in the 1960s and is also known as the KJ Method. Jiro describes his idea for 
the process, saying, “[w]ith masses of data spread around on my desk, I had 
been racking my brains to find some way to integrate them when I suddenly 
realized that depending on the spatial arrangement of the cards, you can see 
new meaning in them and find ways to synthesize the data.”50 While 
originally developed to sort academic data, it has become an integral part of 
the Affinity model. Some facilitators continue to facilitate Affinity with an 
old-fashioned flip-chart and others have incorporated the use of various 
software programs at different stages of the process, such as mind mapping 
and collaboration software, to improve efficiencies. 
The Affinity process includes five steps: 1) Preparation; 2) Set Up; 3) 
Brainwriting; 4) Working the Puzzle; and 5) Final Consensus and Approval.51 
It borrows on the concepts and rules used in the regular IBB, Affinity 
Diagramming, Human Behavior (neuroscience principles) considerations, 
and a newly-created step to build a zone of possible agreement (explained 
below). FMCS also insists that the parties do not caucus during the Affinity 
economic bargaining steps 3, 4, and 5. 
1. Preparation 
This is the official beginning of the Affinity process. It further 
breaks down into four parts with terminology and process 
similar to the IBB process discussed above. The steps are “1) issue 
identification, and, if necessary, grouping; 2) interest 
identification; 3) information identification, gathering, and 
review; and 4) development of a common economic language.”52 
Issue identification is determining the real economic issues that 
are concerns for each of the parties. The process is different than 
identifying issues in traditional negotiations, where each party 
includes non-critical “bargaining chip” issues. In Affinity 
bargaining, each party is required to explain and defend its 
issues, so it is critical the parties only include issues they are truly 
concerned with and not throw-away issues.53 There is frequently 
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similarity in issues, and those issues can be grouped. For 
instance, if the union seeks more time off and the employer wants 
to clarify procedures for when certain time off can be taken, these 
issues may be grouped as they are similar concerns. 
After identifying the issues, each party must discuss the interests 
related to each of its issues, so the other party can understand 
why the issue is important to the party who raised it.  This is 
similar to the “telling the story” concept discussed above. Only 
through the sharing of interests can a party fully explain why the 
issue is important and can the other party begin to understand.  
After identifying all the interests related to each issue, the parties 
must discuss what kind of information is needed in order to 
completely vet the issues and interests.54 Such information may 
include scattergrams, insurance census information, comparable 
employer data, and other necessary financial information. 
Gathering information is the obligation of both the employer and 
the union. There is usually a period of time between discussing 
what information needs to be gathered and the beginning of the 
actual negotiations as information gathering may take some 
time. It is critical that all participants understand the data 
gathered and its significance. Only by working off shared 
information and agreement as to what the financial information 
means can the parties have a common economic language. This 
is critical to making the process a success. 
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2. Set up 
This is about the room and physical surroundings where 
bargaining is going to take place.55 While in the early days of the 
process, lots of wall space was required to utilize flipchart paper, 
as discussed, most IBB is now done using mind mapping 
software that permits all ideas to be diagrammed. Often, a 
combination of the two will be used. As for the room set-up for 
collaborative bargaining, a round or rectangular table shape is 
best. Unlike traditional bargaining, the participants are then 
interspersed amongst each other so, preferably, a management 
participant would find himself flanked on both sides by union 
participants and vice-versa. In any event, during the Affinity 
process, participants can expect to be standing during most of 
the process. 
 
For each of the economic issues, there is a flip-chart sheet or 
mind map page identifying the topic/workspace.56 For instance, 
wages, health insurance, pensions, and leaves of absence are 
common individual Affinity topics. 
3. Brainwriting 
This is the option generation part of the process and it naturally 
follows the discussions on issues and interests.57 For stand-alone 
issues and in the IBB process, individuals call out ideas and they 
are added to the mind map then discussed and processed down 
to a solution. If using the flip-chart method, the ideas are written 
on a post-it note and placed in the appropriate category. For 
example, if one of the Affinity topics is insurance, the employer 
may write “increase employee premium contributions by 5%.” 
The union might write “status quo on premium contributions.” 
This process is happening live, and there are typically many 
ideas/post-it notes in each category.58 
 
FMCS describes that during brainwriting, “once a post-it is 
placed in the workspace it becomes community property. There 
is no team ownership of ideas or options.”59 Different from 
traditional bargaining, participants are simply generating 
options and vetting ideas. The facilitator will only direct the 
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participants to move on to step four when there do not appear to 
be any more solutions for any of the identified areas.60 
 
4. Working the Puzzle  
This is the next step in the process. In addition to the workspaces 
for each of the economic issues, there is one flip-chart sheet titled 
“union” and one titled “employer.” We will refer to these as the 
employer and the union staging areas. Between the staging areas 
is a sheet titled what FMCS calls the Zone of Possible Agreement 
(“ZOPA”).61 This is what will become the parties’ tentative 
agreement. As individuals review the options posted for each of 
the economic issues, if a party finds an acceptable solution, the 
party can move that solution to their staging area. For instance, 
if under “health insurance” the union finds it acceptable for the 
employer to have the latitude to change carriers, union 
participants will move a post-it note stating such to the union 
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staging area. Similarly, if the employer is agreeable to an 
additional paid sick day and a new provision that employees 
forfeit sick days not taken, the employer can put those two 
solutions/post-it notes together and move them to the employer 
silo. Ideally, there will be solutions for all outstanding economic 
issues on either the employer’s or the union’s staging areas or 
both. Additionally, because the parties know they have to find 
agreeable final solutions to all economic issues, the employer 
does not move solutions to its staging area that the employer 
knows will not be agreeable to the union and vice-versa.62 
 
Each party assesses the other party’s posted solutions and ideas. 
As the union participants now know what is acceptable to the 
employer participants, the available solutions have been 
narrowed. Sometimes ideas are grouped together, and solutions 
are further clarified. It is at this point that all participants are 
gathered around the three sheets—the union staging area, the 
employer staging area, and the ZOPA. 
 
Now a key rule comes into play. The employer participants may 
only move options from the union staging area to the ZOPA. The 
union participants may only move options from the employer 
staging area to the ZOPA.63 As such, the parties are forced to find 
acceptable solutions within the other party’s staging area. This 
process works because the parties are each working under the 
understanding that they are to only move options to their staging 
areas that the other side will find agreeable. The parties together 
then discuss the options in the staging areas and through 
“explanation, creation, linking, elimination or modification of 
options,” gradually build up the ZOPA, and the formation of a 
potential tentative agreement emerges.”64  This stage has been 
described as “organized chaos” because of the organic nature in 
which multiple discussions form at any time. Anyone is 
welcomed and encouraged to join in on any discussion that is 
taking place in room. Because of the “no caucus” rule there is 
understanding and expectation that anyone can join in on a 
conversation in the spirit of transparency, understanding, and 
problem-solving.65 
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5. Final Consensus and Approval  
This occurs when the participants believe they have reached 
consensus on all outstanding issues.66 Ideally, the acceptable 
solutions have all been moved from the parties’ staging areas to 
the ZOPA. Consensus does not mean that both parties achieved 
all their objectives, but rather the agreement is one both parties 
can live with and support. Consensus seeks unity between all 
participants. Consensus forces discussion. It is important that 
members do not simply agree to avoid conflict, but rather ask 
questions, provide feedback, and consider alternatives. 
 
The last step is the drafting of the actual contract language. As 
the parties have defined what they are seeking, the drafting of 
the language should ideally not be difficult.67 
 
With any IBB process, an important step is that participants 
from both teams attend a training, ideally two days in length and 
facilitated by a mediator. The training is centered around team 
building, explanation of the process, and discussions on 
participation expectations in order to get the most successful 
outcome in the bargaining process. Like the process itself, it is 
crucial that the training be provided by an experienced non-
party facilitator. An unsuccessful training will likely result in an 
unsuccessful interest-based bargaining process. FMCS can assist 
parties in selecting the collaborative bargaining model that will 
increase the odds of success for the parties based on either the 
pre-training assessment, the dynamics witnessed in the training, 
or a combination of the two. On rare occasions FMCS has even 
recommended that parties use a traditional bargaining approach 
if the parties are unable to fully commit to the collaborative 
principles needed for success. 
V. THE WESTMINSTER NEGOTIATIONS  
A. Pre-Negotiations 
The process began on January 17 with the two-day IBB training. The training 
was facilitated by Javier Ramirez and attended by twenty-two individuals, 
not all of whom were going to be present for the negotiations. As the IBB 
process is markedly different than the traditional negotiations some had 
experienced (and in this case, only a few of the participants had been in any 
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labor negotiations at all), there was great interest. As support for the process 
and those who would be at the table, City staff thought it important to have 
large participation in the training. 
Through two back-to-back days, the participants became more comfortable 
with each other. Team members from both sides were interspersed around a 
U-shaped table, IAFF member next to City representative. Each team 
contributed food and all meals were shared together. For two days, the 
participants spent their time together in one room, building a bond engaged 
in exercises and shared experiences. As Deputy Fire Chief Derik Minard 
stated, “the collaborative approach took away potential barriers and brought 
the teams together to work as one. It was a positive, team-building training. 
This set the stage for a positive working relationship.”68 
At the end of the training, the participants agreed on ground rules for the 
negotiations and had collaborated to create a mission statement for the 
process. The mission statement was: “To build a mutually beneficial 
collective bargaining agreement though respect, trust, transparency and 
collaboration.” 
The selection of the bargaining team from the City side was thoughtful and 
strategic, with representatives from human resources and Fire Department 
administration. Fire Chief Doug Hall sat through the IBB training session 
and was interested in participating but recognized that Deputy Chief Minard 
and EMS Chief Erik Birk were better suited to the negotiations process.  
Local 2889 was also careful in the selection of its participants, seeking to 
select participants with the greatest outcome for success. While Local IAFF 
counsel was not present, a firefighter/IAFF representative from the Denver 
Fire Department participated in the IBB training and some of the 
negotiations as support to the Westminster Local. When bargaining began 
shortly thereafter, the participants felt they had trust in the process and the 
other team for a strong foundation to begin bargaining. 
The Ordinance requires that negotiations be completed within thirty days 
from the start date, with a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) ratified by 
Local 2889 membership and approved by the City Council by no later than 
April 30, 2018.69 The timeline includes having a fully-ratified/approved CBA 
with a January, 2019 effective date – a short timeline for a first contract. 
Adopting the Affinity process for both the initial, non-economic process and 
the economic issues happened organically. Upon observing the dynamics of 
Spring 2019  ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT  23 
the training process and realizing that the parties had a high level of 
collaboration and trust, Director Ramirez suggested that the parties attempt 
Affinity for all issues. Director Ramirez had not previously used the Affinity 
process for a negotiation from start to finish. When asked why he made his 
recommendation in Westminster, he stated that he thought the participants 
could truly honor the necessary elements” that would make Affinity work: 
“You all had the authority and drive to want to get a deal.”70 
B. The Negotiations 
The first day of bargaining was February 8, 2018, and there was an energy in 
the room from the beginning. The participants had been exchanging 
information and discussing the process since the training and all participants 
were anxious to begin. Colored post-it notes were available and individuals 
and groups of participants began immediately contemplating what to write. 
On the walls on flip-chart paper were the following broad headings of issues 
for discussion: wages, provisional pay, grievance handling, discipline 
representation, discipline process, union issues, promotion process, 
expeditious job offers, paramedic recruitment and retention, and no-strike 
clause/penalty. 
The participants began moving around the room, discussing and writing 
options on the post-it notes. The participants tended to gravitate toward 
other team members (employer to employer and union to union) in 
determining what to write on a post-it note. Human nature dictates that a 
union team member wouldn’t put something on a post-it note that he/she 
has not discussed with the team, and vice-versa. But all such discussions 
were forced to happen in the large room as a huddle, not a caucus. A huddle 
is a more fluid process. In a huddle, members of the other team are 
permitted, and encouraged, to enter the conversation. It is the mediator’s job 
to make the conversation broader. Deputy Chief Minard recalled, “at times, 
two people would turn into a larger group to sort through the issue. At times, 
Director Ramirez would make it a focal point and the collective group would 
resolve it. When there were contentious issues, other team members would 
recognize a conversation was not going well and intervene to bring it back on 
track. This was a group effort.”71 At the end of the first day, a small economic 
subcommittee was formed to gather baseline financial data and agree on a 
common spreadsheet to be used for wages. Fortunately, there was a 
representative from each team that was skilled at working the spreadsheets.  
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Between meetings, contract language was drafted so it could be reviewed and 
finalized at the next session. Sometimes the language had to be drafted after 
a long day of bargaining because the parties were bargaining the very next 
day. It was important that language be finalized as soon as there was 
agreement so the participants could review the language while it was still 
fresh and then put it aside to further narrow the issues. Some of the standard 
clauses were drafted ahead of time so another subcommittee could review 
the language, make any necessary edits and finalize it so this process didn’t 
have to be completed at the end. 
Once the participants had completed the process of moving solutions to their 
respective staging areas and then into the ZOPA, which led to tentative 
agreement on most of the issues, some unresolved issues were put into a 
parking lot. Language was drafted for all agreed-upon issues, which was 
reviewed, tweaked and finalized. The economic subcommittee worked to 
finalize agreement on spreadsheets and work different scenarios to be 
presented to the larger group. The parties then moved to a smaller room to 
review and finalize language, work through and resolve issues in the parking 
lot, and review the financial data and spreadsheets to discuss and reach 
agreement on the core economic issues. 
Working through the core economic issues was more challenging. Using and 
tweaking the spreadsheets that provided information on wages, provisional 
pay, pensions, and other related costs, the parties worked toward an 
agreement. Representatives from both teams came up with a tool that would 
enable the calculation of a split-year increase, which was the creative idea 
that paved the way to settlement. At one point on the last day, when the 
parties were quite certain they had a deal on wages, the teams agreed to 
permit the City’s budget director to participate for a final number-crunching 
and confirmation session. 
While the parties had scheduled a total of eight full days for negotiations, the 
contract was finalized with tentative agreements on all outstanding items by 
the sixth scheduled day. 
Spring 2019  ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT  25 
 
 
C. Final Agreement, Ratification and Approval 
The final agreement looks much like other collective bargaining agreements 
with some notable language. In the preamble, it was important to capture the 
parties’ view for the future, which was done with the following language: 
“[t]he parties commit to maintaining a healthy, inclusive culture where all 
employees are respected as contributing members of the City workforce with 
the same vision and values serving our community.” 
With a commitment to future joint problem-solving, the parties agreed to a 
labor-management committee and joint safety committee, and other 
committees as the parties deemed necessary. There is also an agreement to 
work together on a promotional process, which was an issue important to 
Local 2889. In February 2019, post-negotiations, the parties worked 
together to complete an extensive performance improvement program, 
which is in the implementation phase currently. 
Because fair share fees were in jeopardy with Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31 
having been heard by the Supreme Court but no decision having been issued 
at the time of the negotiations, the parties decided to include a side letter on 
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fair share in the event such fees were deemed unconstitutional, which they 
subsequently were. 72 This was done to avoid having to renegotiate this 
provision. 
Because this was an important moment for the City and the Union, Local 
2889 President Ron Taylor proposed to include the names of all City 
employees involved in the process as part of the agreement, specifically 
mentioning the fact that the agreement was reached using a “collaborative 
Interest-Based Bargaining process.” 
Local 2889 membership ratified the agreement unanimously on March 19, 
2018, and the City Council approved the agreement on April 2, 2018, well 
ahead of the ordinance’s April 30 deadline. The agreement’s effective date 
was January 7, 2019 and is set to expire January 3, 2021.73 At the Council 
meeting to approve the agreement, the Local 2889 Executive Board was 
present to show their support for the agreement to the City Council. At that 
meeting, Deputy Chief Minard stated, “the beautiful thing is we have such a 
strong relationship, from our lowest fire fighter to the chief, that relationship 
translated into the negotiation process. It really was not all that different 
from the way we were doing business from the beginning.”74 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Westminster experience is a solid example of what can be accomplished 
when all stakeholders are committed to a spirit of collaboration. While this 
experience was unique due to the fact the parties were able to work together 
on a referendum question and then the drafting of an ordinance, the 
collaboration that continued into the bargaining process and beyond was 
certainly something that can be replicated. For Westminster, the participants 
and stakeholders have built a model not only for future negotiations, but for 
future issues of any kind. 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
By Student Editorial Board: 
Johnny D. Derogene, Patrick J. Foote, Miranda L. Huber, and Matt Soaper 
 
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee 
Relations Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the 
public employment relations community. This issue focuses on 
developments under the public employee collective bargaining statutes. 
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Arbitration 
In University Professionals of Illinois and Western Illinois University, 35 
PERI ¶ 133 (IELRB 2019), the IELRB held that an arbitrator, when issuing 
an award sustaining a grievance, has the authority to retain jurisdiction over 
implementation of the awarded remedy. After Western Illinois University 
(“WIU”) implemented a series of layoffs in January 2016, the University 
Professionals of Illinois, Local 4100 grieved them. The grievances on behalf 
of laid-off faculty moved to arbitration in April 2017, and the arbitrator 
subsequently issued an award for some of the grievants. The award included 
backpay for at least one professor, as well as a requirement that WIU 
affirmatively look for placements within its system for those who had been 
laid off from their original positions. The union had requested that the 
arbitrator retain jurisdiction over the award to supervise its implementation 
and respond to any problems that might arise. The arbitrator agreed, saying 
that he would retain jurisdiction for at least 90 days while the award was 
implemented. The university did not object to the arbitrator’s retention at 
hearing, nor did it discuss that issue in its post-hearing brief.  
Subsequently, counsel for the union sent an email to the university invoking 
the retained jurisdiction over the remedy. The union alleged that the 
university had not complied with the award with regard to five grievants. The 
university responded with letters that were issued to those grievants; it also 
stated that there was no need for further proceedings on the matter. The 
union replied by continuing to request relief. Once the hearing was 
scheduled, the union stated that it was now challenging WIU’s 
implementation of the arbitration award for only four grievants. At this 
supplemental hearing, the university stated that this dispute could only be 
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decided by the IELRB; the union continued to argue that the issue was within 
the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. 
The arbitrator’s supplemental award concluded that the university had not 
made a good faith effort to alter its decision to lay off one grievant; as to the 
other grievants, the arbitrator noted that the university was not required to 
displace another employee to find work for a grievant but also could not take 
unusual measures to avoid giving the grievants work. That reasoning led the 
arbitrator to find that WIU had failed to implement the original award as to 
one other grievant. The arbitrator also directed that the grievant be made 
whole for the semester she had missed and be given the opportunity to teach 
the following school year. Afterward, the union requested a second 
supplemental award; when the arbitrator requested WIU’s response, the 
university noted that the matter was pending before the IELRB and that an 
IELRB decision would moot the union’s request. The arbitrator determined 
that he would let the IELRB rule on the charge; if the IELRB found he had 
jurisdiction, he would then rule on the merits. 
The IELRB held that the arbitrator could retain jurisdiction over the award. 
The IELRB noted that arbitrators’ retention of jurisdiction over 
implementation of a remedy was commonly upheld in Illinois. In 
Pennsylvania – the state whose labor relations law served as a model for the 
IELRA – the courts have also upheld arbitrators’ retention of jurisdiction. 
WIU contended before that the issue of compliance with the award was 
within the IELRB’s exclusive primary jurisdiction and that that issue was 
beyond the arbitrator’s authority under the collective bargaining agreement. 
The IELRB acknowledged that it, instead of the courts, has exclusive primary 
jurisdiction over initially determining compliance issues. However, the 
Labor Board noted that its exclusive primary jurisdiction did not preclude an 
arbitrator from also retaining jurisdiction over the award that he or she 
issued.  
The IELRB also held that the arbitrator had not exceeded his contractual 
authority in issuing the supplemental award. WIU argued that the 
arbitrator’s supplemental award violated a provision in the collective 
bargaining agreement which stated that “arbitration shall be confined solely 
to ... the precise issue(s) submitted to arbitration” and that “[t]he arbitrator 
shall have no authority to determine any other issues.” The IELRB was 
unpersuaded by WIU’s argument. It noted that the supplemental award 
concerning the remedy in the original award did not create a new issue. To 
the contrary, it was part of the issues the parties had already agreed to 
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arbitrate: what the remedy should be. The IELRB finally noted that the 
arbitrator’s retention of his jurisdiction allowed him to determine an 
appropriate remedy: the precise outcome for which the parties had already 
bargained.  
As a result, the IELRB found that the supplemental award was binding and 
upheld the arbitrator’s finding that WIU had not complied with the original 
award. Therefore, it held, WIU violated the IELRA by failing to comply with 
the arbitration awards. 
B. Duty to Bargain 
In Rock Valley College Support Staff, Local 6569, IFT-AFT and Rock Valley 
College, 35 PERI ¶ 150 (IELRB 2019), the IELRB reversed the Administrative 
Law Judge’s recommended decision that the college violated Section 14(a)(5) 
of the IELRA by implementing its last, best and final offer, finding that the 
parties had reached an impasse in their negotiations. The IELRB affirmed 
the ALJ’s decision that the college violated Section 14(a)(5) by changing the 
holiday schedule, but it did not violate Section 14(a)(5) when it unilaterally 
ended merit pay and pay increases for increased workloads. 
During the 2016-2017 school year, the newly-certified union and the college 
were in negotiations for their first collective bargaining agreement. During 
this time, Rock Valley College was in severe financial trouble. In February of 
2017, the college submitted its best and final offer to the union and due to 
the impasse, implemented its unilateral changes. The union contended that 
these changes were illegal because they had not reached an impasse.  
The union also alleged that the college committed an unfair labor practices 
by unilaterally changing two policies. Prior to negotiations, Rock Valley’s 
employee handbook stated that the college’s board had discretion to decide 
whether the college would stay open between Christmas and New Year’s. 
From 2008 to 2015, the college closed and granted employees paid holidays. 
The board decided that, for 2017, the employees would be required to work 
on December 26-28, 2017. The union contended that this constituted a 
unilateral change in a mandatory subject of bargaining, while the college 
stated the decision was a matter of managerial right. A second college policy 
that pre-dated negotiations concerned employee pay increases. This policy 
stated that employees would receive annual salary reviews and pay increases 
would be based on performance, promotions, or changes to the salary ranges 
of each position. The past practice by the college board was mixed on this 
issue. It had in some years given performance-based increases and in other 
34  ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT Spring 2019 
years given flat increases. The union argued that the practice was to give 
increases each year and the college was required to follow that practice while 
negotiations continued. 
The IELRB held that the change to the holiday schedule was a mandatory 
subject of bargaining. The IELRB explained that converting paid time off to 
working time was a change regarding the employees’ wages. Further, the 
IELRB reasoned, it did not impede managerial rights clause because, 
although management had the authority to decide whether the college would 
be open, the changing of pay statuses was a mandatory subject to bargain.  
With regard to the pay increase policy, the IELRB held that the employees 
were not owed increases because there was no consistent past practice on 
which employees could justifiably rely. Finally, the IELRB decided that 
college did not violate section 14(a)(5) when it implemented its final offer in 
negotiations because the parties did reach an impasse. The IELRB examined 
the parties’ offers and counter-offers and found that the union had not made 
any material movement over three months. The IELRB explained that 
because the union had not budged on its proposals despite multiple meetings 
and appeared to not fully grasp the college’s financial troubles nor address 
them in its offers, the college had no other choice but to declare an impasse. 
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Supervisors 
In AFSCME Council 31 and City of Chicago, 35 PERI ¶ 129 (ILRB Local Panel 
2019), the ILRB Local Panel upheld the ALJ’s findings dismissing a majority 
interest petition that the union filed in which it sought to represent a group 
of City of Chicago employees in the job title Supervising Disease Control 
Investigator (SDCI) at the City’s Department of Public Health, and to include 
the employees in one of the union’s existing bargaining units. The Local 
Panel agreed with the Union that its majority interest petition was not barred 
by a 10-year-old Board-issued certification of representation that expressly 
excluded the employees at issue from the bargaining unit. Second, the Local 
Panel found in favor of the city that the SDCI employees were supervisors 
within the meaning of Section 3(r) of the IPLRA; therefore, the union could 
not include them in the bargaining unit, since they were outside of the 
IPLRA’s protection. 
This case began in 2016 when AFSCME filed a majority interest petition 
seeking to represent a group of SDCI’s employees and the city responded 
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with two objections. First, the city argued that the union was barred from 
seeking to represent the SDCI employees because the ILRB issued a 
certification of representative in 2008 that expressly excluded them from the 
bargaining unit in which the union was seeking to include them. The Local 
Panel agreed with the ALJ that the exclusionary clause in the 2008 
certification was insufficient to preclude the union from seeking to represent 
the SDCI employees because the clause failed to identify the reason for 
excluding them from the bargaining unit. In so holding, the ILRB relied on 
its long-standing rule that an exclusionary clause that does not identify the 
reason for excluding certain employees from a bargaining unit is insufficient 
to preclude a union form seeking to organize the excluded employees, unless 
the union waived its right to organize the employees by specifically agreeing 
with the employer that it would refrain from doing so. The Board agreed with 
the ALJ that the city presented no evidence of a “quid pro quo agreement” 
between it and the union concerning exclusion of the employees from the 
bargaining unit as a result of the 2008 certification, nor any reason for the 
exclusion.  
Second, the city argued that the SDCI employees were supervisors within the 
meaning of the IPLRA, and therefore, Section 3(r) precluded their inclusion 
in the bargaining unit. The ILRB agreed with the ALJ that the SDCI 
employees were supervisors. Applying the four-part supervisory test, the ALJ 
found that there was sufficient evidence to establish that (1) the SDCI 
employees’ principal work substantially differed from their subordinates’ 
work; (2) they exercised supervisory authority; (3) with independent 
judgment; and (4) devoted a preponderance of their time exercising their 
supervisory authority. 
The ILRB upheld the ALJ’s conclusion that the SDCI employees possessed 
the supervisory authority to discipline and direct and they did so with the 
requisite independent judgment. The ILRB agreed that the SDCI employees 
directed their subordinates by assigning, overseeing, reviewing, and 
evaluating subordinates’ work, and approving time-off requests. These 
actions gave the SDCI employees discretionary authority to affect the terms 
and conditions of their subordinates’ employment. The Local Panel further 
agreed that the SDCI employees devoted a preponderance of their time 
exercising supervisory authority over their subordinates. Accordingly, the 
ILRB dismissed the union’s certification petition on the ground that the 
SDCI employees were supervisors within the meaning of Section 3(r) of the 
IPLRA. 
